回顧過去二十年來美國政府對蒙政策
Dr. Alicia J. Campi│廖淑馨 譯
過去20年美蒙雙邊關係雖有相當的進展，但其關係的動能，特別是在90年代，是針對正在現代化之中國的發展及瓦解中的蘇聯。1987年美國承認了蒙古，美國只是將蒙古當做中蘇關係以及從莫斯科延伸到一個忠誠的蘇聯衛星國新改革開放政策的一個窗口。美國政府對於蒙古並無一個真正的經濟發展策略。1990年雙方的貿易總額僅有90萬美元的羊絨毛及牲畜副產品的出口。而蒙古幾乎沒有美國的進口品1。
1990年初，美國大使館只有2位全職官員以及一位不駐任所的大使，本人在使館只是暫時性地工作。但在1991年蘇聯瓦解的同時，蒙古放棄了共產主義而採和平民主革命，美國對蒙古的看法完全改變。接下來的17年，美國協助蒙古創造一個穩定的自由市場及民主社會，以作為其他社會主義國家走向同樣艱困轉型的模範。1990年代初在美國大使館的外交人員─均是當代的產物，他們見過越戰期間大規模的、往往是暴力的反政府示威。他們起初並不認為幾千名幾近沉默而規矩地在烏蘭巴托的示威者，會嚴重地威脅在位的蒙古人民革命黨（MPRP）。使館內無人預見，3月7日早上在蘇赫巴托廣場由10人開始，而至晚間增為30人的一項簡單絕食示威所造成的心理影響。美國使館官員及整個外交圈（包括蘇聯及中國）感到驚訝蒙古人民革命黨黨魁及總理巴特蒙赫（Batmonkh）兩天後會在電視上宣稱，停止絕食示威的唯一和平解決之道就是政治局一起辭職。之後，他做了以下的解釋：有人批評我們屈服了。是的，這是一個妥協。但是我們應該了解誰屈服了誰。我們並沒有向外國敵人屈服。我們是向新紀元及年輕的一代屈服。沒有比這更好的事情。2
混亂的政治局指定一個妥協的人選奧其爾巴特（P. Ochirbat）取代巴特蒙赫，成為一個過渡的蒙古人民革命黨的主席。雖然共產制度仍舊運作，新的政治氣候立即反映在和美國關係的加溫上。蒙古第一副總理邊巴蘇倫（D. Byambasüren）3為了第一輪成功的會談，而於4月30日至5月4日訪問華府。在其訪問後的幾天，國務院副助理國務卿安德生（Desaix Anderson）向眾院外交委員會作證，與蒙古建立外交關係是一個特殊的時機了。他說：「在蒙古歷史的轉捩點以及他們的領導們期待我們援助時，我們認為這是加強努力的好時機。」4他說明美國和蒙古關係的發展「. . . 大部分是因為蒙古新的開放外交及經濟政策的結果。」5取代蘇聯：美國穩定蒙古的政經政策美國政府早在共產主義瓦解前已決定派一位新大使駐烏蘭巴托。新大使雷克（JosephLake）在參院作證時證實在蒙古開館將增加167,000美元，幾乎是1990年會計年度大使館預算的3分之1。他說，「顯然時代變了。」6雷克於7月18日抵達烏蘭巴托，可能是國務院最偏遠的外館，是兩國嶄新多元關係的象徵。雷克到任後兩星期，國務卿貝克（James Baker）首次訪蒙，當時因為伊拉克入侵科威特，成此趟訪問不到12小時。1年後，貝克再度訪問蒙古，以補上次訪問之不足。雷克大使後來之所以說「若無貝克對於蒙古有興趣以及對蒙古之承諾，就不會有美蒙的關係。」7國務卿的訪蒙提高蒙古以及美國決策者的姿態，美國決策者擔心中國在天安門事件後的不穩定以及蘇聯的瓦解。過去20多年美國眾院以及政府也表現出對蒙古有份特別的喜愛。
1998年國務卿歐布萊（Madeleine Albright）及前總統克林頓夫人（Hillary RodhamClinton）的高層訪問蒙古可以說明。這樣的官方訪問如雪球般地增加，並且在2005年隨著國防部長onald Rumsfeld 及 國務卿Condoleezza Rice 甚至George W. Bush總統的訪問而達到高峰。
雷克於1990年初擔任駐蒙大使，正好是蒙古在經濟上最困難的時刻。蘇聯的大量援助不見了，蒙古經濟陷入大衰退。解的都市經濟普遍遭遇到肉類、奶品及電力的短缺之苦。當破產的國營企業崩潰時，人民逃離工業城達爾汗及喬巴山以及所有的省會，而湧入烏蘭巴托。30萬人口的首都，其人口一下子就多了1倍。失業及通膨高升，帶來了流浪人口、無家可歸的街童以及犯罪等社會問題。美國及蒙古的決策者見到加強雙邊關係的戰略優勢，特別是政治方面的關係。1990年代初，許多蒙古人包括首度民主選出的總統奧其爾巴特8相信，儘快與美國建立堅定可行的關係是非常重要的。他於1991年1月訪問美國會見布希總統。9
布希宣布和蒙古已簽訂一項科技協定，10並給予蒙古價值8百萬美元的糧食賒欠及最惠國待遇的地位。華盛頓展開一項美國援外總署(USAID)計畫以幫助蒙古的自由市場改革。21位和平團的團員自願從1991年夏天開始在烏蘭巴托教授英文及電腦，這項服務慢慢地擴展到鄉下。在教育的領域方面，原來預定給中國的美國政府獎學金也有幾年轉給了蒙古，讓年輕的蒙古民主及政治活躍人物能進入美國的頂尖機構如哈佛大學。
1987年蒙古有5個蘇聯軍區，但在1992年之前就全撤走了，雖然還有幾百名蘇聯顧問留在蒙古。5年內，這些蘇聯專家很快地全被來自美國、其他西方國家及日本和韓國的新經濟專家取代了。美國對蒙政策在很大的一個程度上是自然產生而無須費心建構。雷克後來承認：「如同我們先前所說的，沒有人預期蒙古最後會發生什麼結果。蘇聯瓦解，整個世界改變了。我們原先想要協助蒙古建設其未來的假設不再存在……對蒙古而言，這是一個非常困難的時期」11。
美國以及其他的援助國家最先要做的是，建立一個機制以支撐湧入烏蘭巴托市的鄉下民眾。美國於1991年提供了緊急能源援助的資金以及1990年代中提供了緊急的奶油及小麥支援給蒙古。同時蒙古逐漸將西方援國——特別是美國——視為可以取代曾占蒙古3分之1預算的蘇聯援助的當然人選。12冷戰勝利者的美國在反傳統的「震盪治療」13的戰略之後，扮起了主導加速蒙古政治改革及採取自由市場經濟的設計及執行者的角色。這個戰略包括了儘速地取消對價格及貿易的經濟控制，而轉為浮動匯率以及無國家補助的嚴格工資及信貸管制的私有市場經濟。同時完成了國有財產私有化、財政金融改革、鼓勵外國投資、重整教育及保健等的組織改造。結果卻不順，1990年代的前五年，經濟混亂及矛盾使得貧窮及失業增加。美國在1990年代的援助計畫每年達1,200─1,700萬美元，位居日本及德國之後，成為第三大援蒙國家。在此期間，蒙古每年接受外援達2億美元。美國在早期都是透過美國援外總署的計畫，只將援款撥給幾個大型的計畫，例如：購買價值500萬美元的蘇聯零件供位在烏蘭巴托市的蘇聯興建的老式電站使用以及法律及銀行方面的訓練。14
美國國會在National Endowment for Democracy（國家民主基金會）之下設立了 the International Republican Institute（簡稱：IRI）（共和黨國際事務協會），並於1992年在蒙古工作。IRI 連同美國援外總署以及國務院的經費集中在教導年輕的蒙古民主領袖現代政治競選及組織技術，以及教育蒙古政府官員增加效率、可信度、以及強化政治的進程。
IRI的官員推展快速私有化政策以及類似美國保守政治家Mewt Gingrich在其「與美國有約」發展出來之政治行動的概念。實上，年輕的蒙古改革人士在1995年受到鼓勵出版了他們自己的「與蒙古選民之約定」，他們認為這個幫助他們贏得了1996年的國會選舉。在轉型的早期，美國有三家私人合資企業投資在駝絨及羊絨方面，它們因共產時期畜毛收購制度的崩潰而受到嚴重影響。1999年蒙古獲得美國的最惠國待遇，使得其紡織品得以進入美國市場。蒙古出口美國貨值在第一個10年僅有90萬美元，而在2000年直達9,290萬美元，僅次於輸出中國的27,430萬美元。15
美國的援助幾乎沒有送到鄉下給牧民，而這是擴大蒙古的城鄉居民的經濟及文化鴻溝的原因。然而這種偏袒都市卻被視為十分正確的政策，因為顧問們錯誤地害怕，蒙古的經濟發展在共產主義瓦解之後會轉向鄉間，開始生產牲畜副產品以及向蒙古鄰國出口食品的新手工工業。美國的經濟計畫者建議，若蒙古要脫離都市失業的問題，它應該要刺激小企業及集中發展「基本的財產權，有關貿易方面的商業法及解決糾紛的機制。」16
美國顧問及美國援
外總署的官員認為，蒙古應採用西方國家有關土地使用及土地擁有所累積的智慧。這項有缺點的政策建議並未考慮到蒙古的遊牧經濟，或者造成遊牧生活方式的嚴峻氣候環境。而這卻是了解傳統蒙古人對財產權的想法的主要方法。蒙古尋找「第三鄰國」蒙古及美國政治學家及決策者在90年代初期擔心中國獨占蒙古經濟的潛力，就如同其北鄰蘇聯在共產時期所為一樣。那個時候蘇聯是動盪不安而無法與中國的經濟活動力競爭。在這樣一個不確定的戰略環境中，國務卿貝克在1990年首次向蒙古提出所謂「第三鄰國」的外交政策新概念。17
具有政治、軍事、文化及經濟內涵的這個戰略概念意味著其他大國，例如美國、德國或日本可以扮演猶如「第三鄰國」的角色，以與蒙古邊鄰中國和蘇聯扮演的傳統角色抗衡。蒙古決策者很快地喜歡上這個概念，並且在1990年代開始「尋求第三鄰國」的工作。蒙古在後冷戰時期的國際外交政策的主要目標，標示在1994年6月30日蒙古國會通過的兩個文件─國家安全概念18以及外交政策概念19。
國家安全概念強調的是，蒙古找尋一個多元的夥伴或者多支柱的方法，以確保其重要的利益。最優先的是，與其鄰國─中國及蘇聯保持等距離，但是它會「尋找一個開放的外交政策。」這個新戰略思想的一個成果是，蒙古政治學者及經濟學家支持蒙古與東北亞地區的整合，並認為它是國家發展及繁榮的最好機會，同時可以平衡中國的政經影響。東北亞被稱做蒙古的自然經濟領土20，類似「區域性的第三鄰國」。許多蒙古政府首長接受這個概念，因為它似乎是可以很快地從亞太地區經濟的成功而獲益的一個辦法。21
很不幸地，1990年代中期之後亞洲金融危機粉碎了日本或韓國成為第三鄰國的所有希望。在歐洲，德國則有自己的重新統一的問題。因此，對於蒙古來說，美國是「第三鄰國」的唯一現實選擇。誠如蒙古前外交部長L. Erdenchuluun 22寫道：「對許多蒙古政治家及政府官員而言，美國是新蒙古的救星以及蒙古國家安全的「主要支柱」。23
但最初美國官員認為第三鄰國概念是一個無成功希望的構想，因為他們認為蒙古是一個友好但介於美國重要對手中國及蘇聯之間的小國。九一一事件發生以及國際恐怖主義昇高，美國提高警覺並重估其戰略利益，而在21世紀初接受和蒙古為第三鄰國的關係。美國政策及蒙古民主聯盟政府1990年代中期雙方互派大使。民主聯盟湊巧在1996年的蒙古國會選舉獲得大勝。在英國受過訓的Jalbuugiin Choinkhor派駐華盛頓7年。他強調要擴大與美國政府的政經協定。他的主要成就是，1997年美國支持蒙古加入世界貿易組織，並於1999年給予最惠國待遇地位。美大使Alphonse La Porta於1997─2000年駐烏蘭巴托期間，他顯然地改變了美國的發展援助計畫方向，而朝向於親美商業及投資計畫上。
美國對民主聯盟政府的影響很大，甚至於模仿蘇聯顧問在共產時期所採用的架構。三位美國計畫經濟學家於國家大廈的蒙古總理辦公室辦公，獲得空前未有的接近蒙古決策機構的權力。美國顧問和年輕的蒙古人一起評估政策改革的必要性，決定優先次序、擬出議程、找出其他可行辦法、而在選出的辦法中建立共識，以及執行新的計畫綱要。他們一起將銀行組織私有化，以及重修過去MPRP（蒙古人民革命黨）控制時期的保護主義以及反投資的法律。
同時，美國援外總署在支援蒙古進行中的政經轉型的發展邏輯上也有一些改變，而透過提高經濟繁榮及大幅成長以及民主和法治的方法。主要的美國援助重點在90年代後半期是：(１)在財政及能源部門改革的設計及執行上，提供技術援助，(２)完成蒙古國有財產的私有化，以及(３)執行農業及貿易政策的現代化。當1990年代有幾個主要的聯合國發展計畫(UNDP)及世界銀行經援的研究指出，增進自由市場及政府組織私有化的美國支援計畫造成貧窮，而非減少貧窮24時，美國為蒙古所做的經濟計畫效能引起質疑。美國援外總署不同意世界銀行在1995年及UNDP 在1998年所採用衡量生活水平的調查(LSMS)方法，並宣稱在蒙古鄉下，仍有3分之1人口生活在貧窮線以下。有位美國研究學者引述，經濟指數指出蒙古有一半的人口從事農業，而他們在1995─1998年之間提高了國民人均所得成長超過50%，而貧窮及極貧牧民家庭擁有牲畜頭數在1998年比1995年多了三倍。而且，最貧窮人口的糧食消費亦在這些年之間明顯地增加。
新世紀的關係
當蒙古牧民忍受了幾年嚴峻的各種冬天災害，而迫使美國以及其他援蒙國家和蒙古中央政府更注意蒙古的特殊遊牧經濟時，這項有關貧窮及它在鄉下的界定之爭論在上世紀末時消沈了。鄉下人口在1995年占總人口的46.6%，1998年增加到50.4%，但在冬害期間快速下降，在2000年占42.8%。25大多數鄉下貧民湧入烏蘭巴托更造成首都的問題。希望蒙古在1999年獲得在美國市場的最惠國待遇地位，可以幫助牧民的畜毛產品賣得高價。1999年之後，蒙古輸美的服飾及紡織品明顯地增加，到了2002年它占蒙古總出口的45%。不過1999─2002年之間，一些未加工的物質愈來愈多非法運到中國加工時，蒙古的羊毛及畜毛產品在世界市場事實上少了8%。 而且，投資在羊絨及駝毛收購方面的美國公司多年來未受到美國政府充分的支持後，最後聯袂自蒙古市場撤退到中國。因此，美蒙在牧業經濟產品的貿易，最後並未如預期的提升，兩國的整體貿易在1990代並未有顯著的發展。
然而在許多方面，1990年代是美蒙經濟關係的全盛時期。在那段期間，美國是蒙古最大的投資國，因為除了紐約市的Mongol Amicale投資羊絨及駝毛方面外，還有休士頓的SOCO Tamsag在石油方面的投資。26
但美國在礦業營運方面的大規模投資並未如預期，原因是幾年來就礦業法內容、蒙古投資法的修訂、以及和國際貨幣組織的課稅及關稅的紛爭不斷。在這樣一種易變的情況下，美國資金從蒙古流出。SOCO在2004年賣給中國。到了2006年，美國的投資落到第5位。過去幾年雙方在軍事合作領域的關係有顯著成長。起先，只限於英語教學、醫藥、民防、災害救濟以及軍法訓練。而與1996─2000年的親民主政府在防禦上的合作已進展到具體的計畫，美國提供蒙古軍隊現代化的援助，特別是為了加入全球和平行動(the Global Peace Operations Initiative) 的一部分之國際維和的設計。蒙古與美國的軍事關係令俄國及中國擔心，它們認為這樣的行動是美國企圖在此地區建立其勢力。27
而在2001年之後，當中亞各國都擔心激進的伊斯蘭恐怖份子流竄時，俄國及中國無法公開地抱怨，蒙古在伊拉克及阿富汗提供軍事活動以及和美軍一起參加區域的聯合演習的決定。截至目前，蒙古在波蘭指揮下的伊拉克Ad Diwaniyah 地區的Camp Echo已經提供了10梯次的軍隊28，而且在「可汗遠征」的計畫下主辦過幾次亞洲地區軍事演習。蒙古媒體報導，蒙古將在9月25日撤走其士兵，而且不再派新的替換士兵，即使美國要求這些軍隊留到年底。29
2007年10月23日，當蒙古政府和代理美國政府的 Millennium Challenge Corporation，經過多年的會談而簽下一個5年28,500萬美元的掃貧計畫後，美國援蒙計畫的性質有了重大的改變。蒙古成為亞洲第一個有這樣資格的國家。這份合同將集中在鐵路現代化、財產權、職業教育以及衛生方面。30
結論
當蒙古發展得更民主及實施自由市場制度時，美國不斷地忠告蒙古要很小心地與其兩個強鄰儘量保持等距離的關係。但是，美國的援助政策並未或仍未為達此目的而建構。事實上，可以說相反的模式永遠存在。例如，1990年代的美國援助支持了蒙古對蘇聯能源的依賴。美國投入千萬美元到蘇聯在烏蘭巴托市興造的老舊無用電站，而未幫助蒙古發其自己有規模的能源資源，反而保持蒙古對其北方鄰國的過度依賴。雖然兩國的許多政治及戰略家皆表示，擔心中國人逐漸對蒙古經濟的滲透，並且注意到這個趨勢會有軍事及政治的負面影響，而許多的美國援助計畫卻是針對提高中國成為蒙古的最大消費及貿易夥伴而設計的。而不是增加美國的進口及鼓勵更多的美國投資，以幫助蒙古對抗（中國）的一個趨勢。它只會助長一個環境，使中國企業藉此更容易滲透並壟斷蒙古脆弱的部門。在美蒙建立雙邊關係的13年之後，中國成為蒙古的最大外國投資者以及僅次於俄國的第二大貿易夥伴。這樣的趨勢在新的世紀只會加快，因此到了2007年，中國成為蒙古的最大貿易夥伴，並且占蒙古總出口的60%以上。
過去20年，美國可以說高度支持蒙古同時發展民主機制以及融入全球市場的自由市場經濟。這些政策相當成功，因為美國強力的支持，蒙古於1997年1月成為第一個加入WTO的新轉型國家，即為明證。蒙古已成為美國國會及政府最喜愛的宣傳海報。對他們來說，蒙古證明了在前社會主義國家中，它可以同時執行政經改革─雖然蒙古成就的真實紀錄可以由更多方面來評斷。雖然美國政府的援助政策以及早期美國投資者的活動總是得不到正面的結果，但他們已提供兩國密切合作的好傳統─1987年建交之初從未預期的密切。
進入到雙邊關係的第30年，美國商人對於蒙古礦產蘊藏感到興奮，幾個很大的公司已準備好進入市場。雖然這些計畫因為蒙古的改變投資課稅規則而慢了下來，但仍寄望很高，希望蒙古決策者將會穩定投資的環境，使大的礦產探勘及開採能夠進行。若能如此，美蒙的政治及經濟關係一定會有非常正面的影響。
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1 《The Mongolian Statistical Yearbook》，2000 指出2000年沒有來自美國的進口貨物，見頁180。
2 同上註，頁53。
3 邊巴蘇倫（1942─）是蒙古人民革命黨改革派的一員。他於1989年12月成為部長會議副主席，1990年3月為第一副主席以及國家計畫及經濟委員會主席。終結共黨統治的示威期間，他是蒙古人民革命黨與蒙古民主聯盟的年青示威者的主要協調者。1990─1992年，他是蒙古總理並且在1992年被選為國會議員。1992年12月辭職後，由扎斯萊主政。1993年他創立世界蒙古人大會（World Mongolian Congress）及蒙古發展協會（Mongolian Development Society）。1994 年創立蒙古民主復興黨（Mongolian Democratic Renewal Party），並被選為黨主席。參見Uradyn E. Bulag,Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia (London: Oxford Press, 1998), 87─88; Sanders, Historical Dictionary, 33─35.
4 “Statement for Deputy Assistant Secretary Anderson House Foreign Affairs Committee”(May 14, 1990).
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Lake Confirmation Hearings, “Resident Ambassador” (May 1990), 24
9 George Bush, “Remarks following Discussion with President Punsalmaagyin Ochirbat of Mongolia,”
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1924210 “Agreement Relating to Scientific and Technical Cooperation Between the Governments of the United States andMongolia”(January 23, 1991).
11 Lake, “U.S.-Mongolia Relations,”22.
12 美國人對1990年代初西方顧問在蒙古的逐漸增加，而蘇聯影響力下降的重要分析，參見： Morris Rossabi, Modern
Mongolia, From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists （Berkeley :University of California Press, 2005）, Chapter 2“From Russian to Western Influence,”30─42. 而蒙古對於相同現象的分析，參見Munkh-Ochir D. Khirghis, “Adriftor Advance？ Socio-economic Aspects of Mongolia-Russia Relations at the Onset of the 21st Century,” Neighbors Through the Centuries: History and Contemporary Aspects of Bilateral Relations between Mongolia and Russia,, Vol.
27 (Ulaanbaatar: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), 95─111.
13 東北亞經濟研究院（ERINA）的Enkhbayar Shagdar在ERINA Discussion Paper No. 0703E (Niigata,Japan: April 2007)的一篇報告”Neo-Liberal :Shock Therapy” Policy During the Mongolian Economic Transition,”中稱蒙古的震盪治療為「新自由的」。對於此政策的主要評論者是Keith Griffin. 見Keith Griffin.主編Poverty Reduction in Mongolia(Australia: Asia Pacific Press, 2003). 另一較持平的觀點，參見Julia S. Bilskie and Hugh M. Arnold, “An Examinationof the Political and Economic Transition of Mongolia since the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” Journal of Third WorldStudies, Vol. 19 (Americus, Georgia: Fall 2002), 205─218.
14 Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, “Final Report for Energy Sector Project, Emergency Heat and Power ProjectNo. 1,” Project No. 438─0003, Vol. 1 (July 1993).100
15 Terry McKinley, ‘The National Development Strategy and Aid Coordination,” Poverty Reduction in Mongolia , KeithGriffin ed., (Australia: Asia Pacific Press, 2003), 179─180.
16 Ibid., 15.
17 有關貝克的發言，請見1990年7月與貝克國務卿會談的已故大使Olzvoy的回憶錄. Kh. Olzvoy, “J. Beikeriin Ailchlal xiigeed “guravdaxi tunsh”- uun assudald, “ Olon Ulsin Xariltsaa, (World Affairs), vol. 184(5), no. 1 (Ulaanbaatar),166─168. 蒙古對於「第三鄰國」的分析，請見 Tsedendamba Batbayar, “Geopolitics and Mongolia’s Search forPost-Soviet Identity,” Journal of Eurasian Geography and Economics, vol. 43,no.4 (June 2002), 323─335.18 全文請見the Embassy of Mongolia USA website,
http://www.mongolianembassy.us/eng_foreign_policy/the_concept_of_national_security.php
20 Dr.Robert Scalapino 對 “The Political Process in Northeast Asia and Mongolia’s Challenge,”論文的評論。此未出版的論文發表於蒙美雙邊會議，Mongolia-U.S. Comprehensive Partnership in the Context of North East Asia: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington: February 28, 2005).
21 L. Erdenchuluun, “Mongolia’s strategic option,” in Northeast Asia towards 2000: Interdependence and Conflict？, K. Lho and K. Moller, ed. (Baden-Baden, Germany: 1999), 95 cited in Ts. Batbayar, “Mongolia’s New Identity,”Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, No. 3, (Ulaanbaatar, 1996), 65─66; M. Dugersuren, “Changing Mongoliain a New Environment,” Mongolian Journal , No. 1 (Ulaanbaatar: 1994), 21.
22 Luvsangiin Erdenchuluun 曾是職業外交官，他在1991─1995年為蒙古駐聯合國大使，2000─2004年為蒙古外交部長。2006年他擔任人類安全政策研究中心(Human Security Policy Studies Center)主任。2007年成為聯合國教科文組織行政委員會(the Executive Board of UNESCO)的會員。
23 Erdenchuluun, “Mongolia’s Strategic Options,”95.
24 World Bank, “Mongolia: Poverty Assessment in a Transition Economy,” Report No. 15723─MOG (Washington,D.C.: The World Bank, June 27,1996); NSO/UNDP, “Living Standards Measurement Survey 1998) (Ulaanbaatar: NSO/UNDP, 1998); FIDE, “Review of the 1998 Mongolia Living Standards Measurement Survey,” report prepared for theNSO and the CUNDP (Washington, DC: FIDE, 1999).
25 UNIFEM and UNDP, “A Gender Lens on the Rural Map of Mongolia: Data for Policy”(Ulaanbaatar, 2002), 18.26 FIFTA, “Steppes in the Right Direction ”(Ulaanbaatar, 2006), 2. 2004年SOCO被蒙古政府列為外國投資中最「成功的公司」，而Mongol Ameicale名列第八。其他主要美國投資公司在列者為，GL-Monpolimet （位第十二） U.S.-Sino Company Rock Oil（位第十八）。
27 Tsedendamba Batbayar,” Mongolia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: New Identity and New Challenges,” Regional Security Issues and Mongolia, Vol. 17 (Ulaanbaatar: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 229.
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U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARDS MONGOLIA IN THE LAST 20 YEARS—A EVIEW
Dr. Alicia J. Campi (US-Mongolia Advisory Group, Burke, VA)
Although the bilateral relationship between the United States and Mongolia has grown considerably in the last 20 years, the dynamics of the relationship, particularly in the decade of the 1990s, were mainly reactive—reacting to developments in a modernizing China and a collapsing Soviet Union. In 1987, the year of U.S. recognition of Mongolia, the United States valued Mongolia only as a window on the Sino-Soviet relationship and on the new glastnost and perostroika policies spreading from Moscow to a loyal Soviet satellite.
The American government had no real economic development strategy for Mongolia. In 1990 total bilateral trade turnover between the two countries was a mere $900,000, which were exports of animal hair (cashmere goat and wool) and animal byproducts such as casings. There were almost no American imports reaching Mongolia.1 The embassy in early 1990 consisted of only two full-time officers, myself on temporary assignment, and a non-resident ambassador.
But, in 1991 the American focus towards Mongolia changed completely when Mongolia’s peaceful democratic revolution abandoned communism during the concurrent collapse of the Soviet Union. The U.S. throughout the next 17 years sought to assist Mongolia in creating both a stable free market and a democratic society, which would be a model for other former socialist nations making the same difficult transition.1 9
The diplomats in the U.S. Embassy in early 1990—all products of the generation that had seen large-scale, often violent, anti-government demonstrations during the Vietnam War, at first did not see the several thousands of nearly silent, well-behaved Mongol demonstrators in Ulaanbaatar as serious challengers to the power of the communist Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party or MPRP. No one in the Embassy predicted the psychological impact of a simple hunger strike in Sukhbaatar Square, the capital’s central plaza, that began on the morning of March 7 with ten people and grew by the end of the day to thirty. The American embassy officials and the entire foreign diplomatic community (including the Soviets and Chinese) were shocked to hear MPRP Party leader and Prime Minister Batmönkh announce on television two days later that the only way to find a peaceful solution and to stop the hunger strike was for the Politburo to resign en masse. Batmönkh later explained: “Some people criticized us, saying that we capitulated. Yes, it was a compromise. But we have to understand who has capitulated to whom. We did not capitulate to a foreign enemy. We did capitulate to the arriving new era and to our younger generation. There was nothing better than that.”2
The confused Politburo appointed a compromise candidate, G. Ochirbat, as the new interim MPRP chairman replacing Batmönkh. Although the communist system was still in place, the new political climate immediately was reflected by a warmer relationship with the United States. Mongolian First Deputy Prime Minister D. Byambasüren3, visited Washington from April 30 to May 4 for a successful first round of talks. Just days after his visit, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Desaix Anderson testified to the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee that the establishing of diplomatic relations with Mongolia came at a specially opportune time: “We are presented with unique opportunities to be supportive of positive developments at a turning point in Mongolia’s history and at a time when their leaders are looking to us for assistance.
We think the conditions are right for special effort.”4 He explained that the development of the American relationship with Mongolia “…is in large part an outgrowth of Mongolia’s new open foreign and economic policies.”5 Replacing the Soviets: U.S. Political and Economic Policies to Stabilize Mongolia The U.S. Government, even before the collapse of communism, had made the decision to appoint a new Ambassador who would be resident in Ulaanbaatar. The new Ambassador-designate, Joseph Lake, in Senate testimony justified the additional cost of $167,000, or almost one-third of the FY-1990 embassy budget to locate the ambassador in Mongolia, by saying, “Clearly, the times have changed.”6 Lake arrived on July 18 in Ulaanbaatar, possibly the Department of State’s most isolated foreign service post to be symbol of a new, more dynamic relationship between the two countries. Two weeks after Lake’s arrival, Secretary of State James Baker made his first visit to Mongolia—a visit that was dramatically cut short to less than twelve hours because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Baker visited Mongolia again a year later to make up for the aborted original trip. Ambassador Lake would later declare that “Without [Baker’s] interest in and commitment to Mongolia, there would be no U.S.-Mongolia relationship.”7 These visits by the U.S. Secretary of State raised Mongolia’s profile significantly with American policymakers, who were concerned with instability in China after the Tiananmen incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union. They also initiated a peculiar but potent infatuation with Mongolia by the U.S. Congress and successive American administrations over the past twenty years that explains the highranking visits of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and then First Lady Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton in 1998. Such official courtesy calls snowballed in number in the new millennium, peaking with the 2005 visits of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and even President George W. Bush. Lake’s tenure as ambassador in the early 1990s occurred during the most arduous period for Mongolia economically. Large-scale Soviet assistance disappeared and Mongolia plunged into a deep recession. The disintegrating urban economy suffered widespread meat, milk, and power shortages. As bankrupt state enterprises collapsed,
people fled Mongolia’s industrial cities of Darkhan and Choibalsan, as well as all the aimag capitals, to pour into Ulaanbaatar. The capital city of 300,000 soon doubled its population. Unemployment and inflation soared, bringing in their wake social problems such as hooliganism, homeless street children, and crime.
Policymakers from both the U.S. and Mongolia saw strategic advantages in strengthening the bilateral relationship, especially political ties. During the early 1990s many Mongols, including the first democratically elected President, P. Ochirbat,8 believed it was very important to quickly establish a strong working relationship with the United States. He visited the U.S. in January 1991 to meet with President George Bush.9 Bush announced that the U.S. and Mongolia had signed a science and technology
agreement,10 and he granted eight million dollars worth of food credits and issued the waiver to open the door to granting Mongolia most-favored-nation status. Washington developed a USAID program to assist Mongolia with its free market reforms. A Peace Corps program began in the summer of 1991 with twenty-one volunteers teaching English and computer skills in Ulaanbaatar and slowly expanded to the countryside. In the educational sphere U.S. Government fellowships, originally
destined for China, were diverted for a few years to Mongolia. This enabled young Mongolian democratic, political activists to go to elite U.S. institutions such as Harvard.
In 1987 there were five Soviet army divisions in Mongolia, but by 1992 they had withdrawn, although there remained several hundred Russian advisers. In the first half of the decade these Soviet specialists were soon replaced by hundreds of new economic experts from the U.S. and other western nations, Japan, and South Korea.
To a great extent, American policies developed for Mongolia were spontaneous and not necessarily well constructed. Lake later admitted, In the end, [in] Mongolia, as was said earlier, no one expected what happened. The Soviet Union collapsed. The whole world changed. And so the assumptions we started with in trying to help Mongolia build its future simply did not exist anymore….it was a very difficult time for Mongolia.11
The first priority of the United States, as well as other foreign donors was to find mechanisms to sustain the urban populace pouring into Ulaanbaatar. The United States provided the capital with emergency energy assistance in 1991 and emergency butter and wheat in the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, the Mongols increasingly saw the western donors, particularly the United States, as the logical sources to replace Soviet aid which had amounted to around one-third of the nation’s annual budget.12 It was the United States in its role as winner of the Cold War that took the lead in devising and implementing programs both to accelerate Mongolia’s political reforms and its transition to a free market economy, following a controversial strategy called “shock therapy.”13 This strategy involved removing as fast as possible the command economy controls and regulations on prices and trade to shift to a private market economy by introducing a floating currency exchange rate and strict wage and credit controls with abolition of state subsidies. Concurrently, structural changes such as privatization of government assets, financial and banking reforms, encouragement of foreign investment, and educational and healthcare restructuring were implemented. The results were uneven, and in the first half of the 1990s economic dislocation and contraction increased poverty and unemployment.
The U.S. assistance program totaled some $12-17 million a year in the 1990s, making it the third largest provider of foreign donor assistance to Mongolia, after Japan and Germany. At this time Mongolia was receiving nearly $200 million a year in aid. In these early years, American assistance through the USAID program was granted only to a few large-scale projects, such as procuring $5 million worth of Russian spare parts for its old-style Russian-built power stations in Ulaanbaatar,14 as well for legal and banking training.
The U.S. Congress, which had created the International Republican Institute (IRI) under the National Endowment for Democracy, assigned it to work in Mongolia in 1992. The IRI, with USAID and Department of State funding, focused on teaching modern political campaigning and organization techniques to the young Mongolian democratic leaders and educating Mongolian government officials to increase effectiveness, accountability, and strengthen the political process. IRI officials promoted rapid privatization policies and political action ideas paralleling those developed by American conservative politician Newt Gingrich in his “Contract with America.” In fact, Mongolian young democratic reformers were inspired in 1995 to publish their own “Contract with the Mongolian Voters,” which they claimed helped them win the parliamentary elections of 1996.
In the early transition years, American private investment consisted of three joint ventures in the camel hair and cashmere sectors, which was severely affected by the collapse of the communist era animal hair procurement system. In 1999 Mongolia was granted free trade status, which permitted its textiles to enter the U.S. market. Mongolian exports to the U.S., whose value totaled only $900,000 at the beginning of the decade, skyrocketed to $92.9 million in 2000, second only to $274.3 million in exports to China.15 Almost none of the U.S. aid went to the countryside herders, which contributed to the widening economic and cultural gap between urban and rural Mongols. However, this urban bias was viewed as absolutely correct policy, because consultants wrongly feared that, following the collapse of communism, all economic development in Mongolia would be diverted to the countryside to startup new, craft-based industries manufacturing animal by-products and to providing food exports to Mongolia’s neighbors.
The American economic planners advised that, if Mongolia wanted to find a way out of urban unemployment, it would have to stimulate small enterprises and concentrate on developing “basic property rights, trade facilitating aspects of business law and dispute settlement mechanisms.”16 American consultants and USAID administrators proclaimed that Mongolia should adopt the accumulated wisdom of Western countries regarding land use and land ownership. Such flawed policy recommendations did not include any recognition of Mongolia’s defining nomadic herding economy or the especially harsh climatic environment, which necessitated the transhumant livestock-raising lifestyle that is key to understanding traditional Mongolian views of property rights.
Mongolia’s Search for a “Third Neighbor” Early in the decade Mongolian and American political scientists and policymakers became nervous about China’s potential to monopolize Mongolia’s economy as its northern neighbor, Russia, had done in the communist period. In those years Russia was unstable and not able to compete with Chinese economic dynamism. In this uncertain regional strategic environment a new foreign policy concept, called the “Third Neighbor Policy,” was first proposed for Mongolia in 1990 by Secretary of State James Baker.17 This strategic concept, which had political, military, cultural, an economic components, meant that another large power, such as the U.S., Germany, or Japan, would act as a “Third Neighbor” for Mongolia to counterbalance the traditional roles played by Mongolia’s border neighbors, China and Russia. Mongolian policymakers quickly became enamored by the concept and in the 1990s embarked on the task of “searching for the Third Neighbor.”
Mongolia’s main international foreign policy goals for the post-Cold War period were outlined in two documents adopted by the Mongolian Parliament on June 30, 1994—the Concept of National Security18 and the Concept of Foreign Policy.19 The Concept of National Security emphasized that Mongolia sought a multi-partner or multipillar approach to securing its vital interests. Top priority would be given to balanced relations with its two neighbors, China and Russia, but it would “pursue an open foreign policy.”
One result of this new strategic thinking was that Mongolian political scientists and economists supported Mongolian integration with the Northeast Asian region as the best chance for the country to develop and prosper, as well as to balance China’s economic and political influence. Northeast Asia was called Mongolia’s natural economic territory,20 a kind of “regional Third Neighbor.” Many Mongolian government leaders embraced this concept, because it seemed a way to quickly benefit from the success of the Asia-Pacific economies.21 Unfortunately, in the second half of the 1990s the Asian economic crisis dashed all hopes of the special Third Neighbor role for Japan or South Korea. In Europe Germany was self-absorbed in its own reunification problems. Thus, for Mongolia, the only realistic choice was the United States as “third neighbor.” As former Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Erdenechuluun22 wrote: “To many Mongolian politicians and government officials, the U.S. would appear as the savior of new Mongolia and “major pillar” of its national security.”23 However, at first, American officials dismissed the Third Neighbor concept as a non-starter, because they viewed Mongolia as a friendly,
but minor nation wedged between significant American rivals, Russia and the PRC. It would take the events of September 11, 2001 and the increased attention attached to the rise of international terrorism for the U.S. to recalculate its strategic interests and at the beginning of the twenty-first century to embrace the Third Neighbor relationship with Mongolia.
U.S. Policies and the Mongolian Democratic Coalition Government In the mid-1990s, there was a change of ambassadors on both sides. This coin cided with the victory of the democratic coalition parties in the 1996 Mongolian parliamentary elections. In Washington, Jalbuugiin Choinkhor, who had been trained in Great Britain, began a seven-year posting. Choinkhor emphasized expanding U.S. governmental political and economic agreements. His main accomplishments were garnering strong American support for Mongolia’s 1997 entrance into the World Trade Organization and gaining U.S. Congressional favorable trade status for Mongolia in 1999. During Alphonse La Porta’s ambassadorship in Ulaanbaatar from 1997 to 2000, he markedly changed U.S. developmental assistance policies in the direction of pro-American business and investment projects. U.S. influence in the new democratic coalition government was great, even at times mimicking structures employed by Soviet advisers in the communist era. Three American project economists were physically located in the Mongolian Prime Minister’s Office in the Government House, which gave them unparalleled access to the Mongolian policymaking apparatus. The U.S. advisers worked with young Mongolian counterparts to assess needs for policy reforms, assign priorities, develop an agenda, explore alternative solutions, build consensus around the chosen alternative, and implement new policy structures. Together they privatized the banking structure and revised protectionist and anti-investment legislation from the previous MPRP-controlled period.
t the same time, there was some modification of USAID’s development philosophy of supporting Mongolia’s ongoing economic and political transition through promoting economic prosperity and broad-based growth, as well as democracy and the rule of law. The major American aid focal points during the second half of the decade were (1) providing technical assistance to design and implement reform in the financial and energy sectors, (2) completing privatization of Mongolia’s state enterprises, and (3) carrying out agriculture and trade policy modernization.
The effectiveness of the American economic planning for Mongolia was called into question when in the 1990s several major UNDP and World Bank-funded studies concluded that the American-supported plan to promote free market and privatize government institutions was causing poverty, not relieving it.24 USAID disagreed with the methodology used in the Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) conducted by the World Bank in 1995 and the UNDP in 1998, which claimed that poverty levels in Mongolia’s rural areas remained at one-third of the population. An American researcher cited economic indicators showing that it was the fifty percent of the Mongol population engaged in the agricultural sector that had increased national GDP growth more than fifty percent from 1995 to 1998, and that herd size for poor and very poor herder families in 1998 was three times larger than that for such families in 1995. Furthermore, food consumption among the poorest population also significantly increased during these same years.
Relations in the New Century This debate about poverty and its definition in the countryside was silenced somewhat at the end of the century when Mongolian herders endured several years of severe dzuds (winter disasters of all types) which forced the United States, other foreign assistance donors, and the Mongolian central government to pay more attention to the nation’s specialized nomadic economy. Rural population that had stood at 46.6% in 1995 and peaked at 50.4% in 1998, rapidly fell during the dzud years to 42.8% in 2000.25 Most of the rural poor moved to Ulaanbaatar, further aggravating the capital’s problems.
It was expected that Mongolia’s acquiring free trade status in the U.S. market in 1999 especially would help herders to get better prices for their animal hair products. Mongolia’s apparel and textile related exports, mostly destined for the United States, did increase significantly after 1999, so that by 2002 they accounted for forty-five percent of Mongolia’s total exports. Yet, Mongolian wool and animal hair products actually lost eight percent of the world market share from 1999 to 2002, as these unprocessed materials moved illegally more and more to China for processing. Furthermore,
American companies that had invested in cashmere and camel hair procurement, after years of insufficient support from the American government, finally dropped out of the Mongolian market altogether to retreat to China. So, in the end, U.S.-Mongolian trade in products originating in the herding economy did not increase as predicted, and overall trade between the two countries did not develop to a significant degree in the decade.
Nevertheless, in many ways the 1990s were the heyday for American-Mongolian economic ties. The United States at one point during those years was Mongolia’s largest foreign investor, owing to the presence of SOCO Tamsag of Houston in petroleum and Mongol Amicale out of New York City in the cashmere and camel wool sector.26 But sizable American investment in mining operations did not proceed as expected due to years of contention about the contents of a mining law, revisions in Mongolia’s investment legal regime, and taxation and customs disputes with the IMF. In such a fluid situation, American capital flowed away from Mongolia. SOCO was sold in 2004 to the Chinese. By 2006, United States investment had slipped to fifth place.
It is in the area of military cooperation that the bilateral relationship has grown noticeably in the past few years. At first it was confined to English language teaching, medicine, civil defense, disaster relief, and military legal training. However, with the pro-democracy government of 1996 to 2000, defense cooperation grew into concrete programs in which the U.S. provided assistance to modernize the Mongolian armed forces, especially designed for participating in international peacekeeping as part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative. Mongolia’s military ties to the United States were observed warily by both Russia and China, which viewed such activities as an attempt to establish American power in the region.27 However, after 2001, when all of Inner Asia was concerned about the spread of militant Islamic terrorists, Russia and China could not publicly complain about Mongolia’s decision to provide troops for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and to participate in regional joint exercises with American troops.
To date Mongolia has provided 10 rotations of troops in Iraq under Polish command at Camp Echo in Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq28 and hosted several Asian regional military exercises under the program “Khaan Quest.” It is reported in the Mongolian press that Mongolia will withdraw its soldiers on September 25th and not send a new rotation, although the U.S. side has requested these troops remain until the end of the year.29 The nature of the U.S. foreign aid program in Mongolia was changed fundamentally on October 23, 2007 when the Mongolian Government and the U.S. government agency Millennium Challenge Corporation, after several years of protracted negotiations,
signed a 5-year, $285 million, compact to reduce poverty. Mongolia became the first Asian country to so qualify. The Compact will focus on railroad modernization, property rights, vocational education, and health.30 Conclusion The United States repeatedly advised Mongolia, as it developed more democratic,
free market institutions, to carefully co-exist with its two giant neighbors in as balanced a relationship as possible. Yet, U.S. donor policies were not and still are not structured to achieve that result. In fact, one could say that the opposite pattern was perpetuated. For example, American aid in the 1990s propped up Mongolia’s dependency on Soviet energy power by both pouring tens of millions of dollars into the failing Soviet-built power stations in Ulaanbaatar and by doing nothing to help Mongolia develop its own sizable energy resources rather than remain heavily dependent on its northern neighbor.
Although many political and strategic researchers from both nations expressed concerns about the growing penetration of the Mongolian economy by the Chinese and cautioned that this trend potentially had negative military and political implications, many American aid programs were designed to promote the PRC as Mongolia’s optimal consumer and trade partner. There was no effort to help Mongolia counterbalance this trend with incentives to increase imports from the U.S. and spur greater U.S. investment.
It only encouraged an environment whereby Chinese enterprises could more easily infiltrate and monopolize Mongolia’s weak private sector. Thirteen years after the establishment of U.S.-Mongolian bilateral ties, the PRC had become Mongolia’s leading foreign investor and second largest trade partner after Russia. In the new millennium this trend has only accelerated, so that by 2007 China was Mongolia’s number one trade partner and received over sixty percent of Mongolia’s total exports.
In the past twenty years it can be said that the United States was highly supportive of Mongolia’s simultaneous efforts to develop democratic institutions and a free market economy in order to integrate into the global marketplace. Proof of the relative success of these policies is that in January 1997 Mongolia, strongly backed by the U.S., became the first newly acceding country in transition to join the WTO. Mongolia has become the favorite poster child of the U.S. Congress and Government. To them Mongolia proved it was possible to implement simultaneously political and economic reform in a former socialist country—even though Mongolia’s actual record of accomplishment could be judged as more mixed. Although the U.S. Government’s donor policies and the activities of the early American investors have not always had a positive outcome, they have provided a sound legacy for close cooperation between the two countries—a closeness that was never envisioned at the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1987.
Entering the third decade of the bilateral relationship, American businessmen are excited by Mongolia’s mineral potential, and several very large companies are poised to enter the market. Although such plans have been slowed to a crawl by Mongolian changing investment and tax regulations, hopes remain high that Mongolian policymakers will stabilize the investment environment so that major mineral exploration and exploitation can proceed. If this does happen, it should have a very positive impact on U.S.-Mongolian political as well as economic relations.
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1 The Mongolian Statistical Yearbook, 2000 lists no imports from the U.S. in the year 2000, see 180.
2 Ibid ., 53.
3 Dashiyn Byambasüren (1942─) was a member of the MPRP’s reformist wing. He became deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers in December 1989, the first deputy chairman and concurrently chairman of the State Planning and Economic Committee in March 1990. He was the MPRP’s chief negotiator with the Mongolian Democratic Association’s young demonstrators during the protests that brought about the end of communism. He was Mongolian Prime Minister from 1990 to 1992 and elected to the Mongolian Great Khural in 1992. In December of 1992 he resigned from his seat and the MPRP in opposition to the Jasrai government. In 1993 he founded the World Mongolian Congress and the Mongolian Development Society. In 1994 he founded and was elected leader of the Mongolian Democratic Renewal Party. See Uradyn E. Bulag, Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia (London: Oxford Press, 1998), 87─88; Sanders, Historical Dictionary , 33─35.
4 “Statement for Deputy Assistant Secretary Anderson House Foreign Affairs Committee” (May 4, 1990).
5 Ibid .
6 Ibid .
7 Lake Confirmation Hearings, “Resident Ambassador” (May 1990), 24.
8 Punsalmaalgiin Ochirbat (1942─) was Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Supply from 1987 to 1990 when in March 1990 he was made Chairman of the Council of the People’s Great Khural. On September 3, 1990 became the first democratically elected president of Mongolia. He was re-elected in June 1993, serving until 1997. Sanders, Historical Dictionary,158─159; Jim Hoare and Susan Pares, “Ochirbat,” A Political and Economic Dictionary of East Asia (London: Routledge, 2005), 253.
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761584258/ochirbat_punsalmaagiyn.html 9 George Bush, “Remarks following Discussions with President Punsalmaagyin Ochirbat of Mongolia,”
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php？pid=19242
10“Agreement Relating to Scientific and Technical Cooperation Between the Governments of the United States of America and Mongolia” (January 23, 1991).
11 Lake, “U.S.-Mongolia Relations,” 22.
12 For a critical American analysis of the decline of Soviet influence and the rise of western advisers in Mongolia in the early 1990s, see Morris Rossabi, Modern Mongolia, From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), Chapter 2 “From Russian to Western Influence,” 30─42. For Mongolian analysis of the same phenomenon, see Munkh-Ochir D. Khirghis, “Adrift or Advance？ Socio-economic Aspects of Mongolia-Russia Relations at the Onset of the 21st Century,” Neighbors Through the Centuries: History and Contemporary Aspects of Bilateral Relations between Mongolia and Russia , Vol. 27 (Ulaanbaatar: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), 95─111.
13 Mongolia's shock therapy was dubbed “neo-liberal” by Enkhbayar Shagdar of the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA) in his report “Neo-Liberal “Shock Therapy” Policy During the Mongolian Economic Transition,” ERINA Discussion Paper No. 0703E (Niigata, Japan: April 2007). One of the leading critics of this policy is Keith Griffin. See Poverty Reduction in Mongolia, Keith Griffin , editor (Australia: Asia Pacific Press, 2003). A somewhat more balanced view is found in Julia S. Bilskie and Hugh M. Arnold, “An Examination of the Political and Economic Transition of Mongolia since the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” Journal of Third World Studies , Vol. 19 (Americus, Georgia: Fall 2002), 205─218.
14 Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, “Final Report for Energy Sector Project, Emergency Heat and Power Project No. l, “Project No. 438─0003, Vol. 1 (July 1993).
15 Terry McKinley, “The National Development Strategy and Aid Coordination,” Poverty Reduction in Mongolia, Keith Griffin ed . (Australia: Asia Pacific Press, 2003), 179─180.
16 Ibid ., 15.
17 For further discussion on the Baker statement, see the memoirs of the late ambassador Olzvoy, who participated in negotiations with Secretary Baker in July 1990, Kh. Olzvoi, “J. Beikeriin Ailchlal xiigeed “guravdaxi tunsh”—uun asuudald,” Olon Ulsin Xariltsaa, World Affairs , Vol. 184 (5), No. 1 (Ulaanbaatar, 2002), 166─168. For Mongolian analysis of the “Third Neighbor Concept,” see Tsedendamba Batbayar, “Geopolitics and Mongolia’s Search for Post- Soviet Identity,” Journal of Eurasian Geography and Economics , Vol. 43, No. 4 (June 2002), 323─335.
20 Comment by Dr. Robert Scalapino when presenting “The Political Process in Northeast Asia and Mongolia’s Challenge,” unpublished paper presented at Mongolia-U.S. Bilateral Conference, Mongolia-U.S. Comprehensive Partnership in the Context of North East Asia: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington: February 28, 2005).
21 L. Erdenchuluun, “Mongolia’s strategic options,” in Northeast Asia towards 2000: Interdependence and Conflict？ ,
K. Lho and K. Moller, ed . (Baden-Baden, Germany: 1999), 95 cited in Ts. Batbayar, “Mongolia’s New Identity,” 5; Kh. Olzvoy, “A Mongol’s View of Economic Development and Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” Mongolian Journal of International Affairs , No. 3, (Ulaanbaatar: 1996), 65─66; M. Dugersuren, “Changing Mongolia in a New Environment,” Mongolian Journal, No. 1 (Ulaanbaatar: 1994), 21.
22 Luvsangiin Erdenchuluun was a career diplomat who became Mongolian Ambassador to the United Nations (1991─1995) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (2000─2004). He became president of the Human Security Policy Studies Center in 2006 and a member of the Executive Board of UNESCO in 2007.
23 Erdenchuluun, “Mongolia’s strategic options,” 95.
24 World Bank, “Mongolia: Poverty Assessment in a Transition Economy,” Report No. 15723-MOG (Washington, DC: The World Bank, June 27, 1996); NSO/UNDP, “Living Standards Measurement Survey 1998) (Ulaanbaatar: NSO/UNDP, 1998); FIDE, “Review of the 1998 Mongolia Living Standards Measurement Survey,” report prepared for the NSO and the CUNDP (Washington: DC: FIDE, 1999).
25 UNIFEM and UNDP, “A Gender Lens on the Rural Map of Mongolia: Data for Policy” (Ulaanbaatar, 2002), 18.
26 FIFTA, “Steppes in the Right Direction” (Ulaanbaatar, 2006), 2. As of 2004, SOCO is listed by the Mongolian Government as the Number 1 most “successful company” among foreign investments and Mongol-Amicale is number eight. Other major American investments listed are GL-Monpolimet (ranked twelfth) and the U.S.-Sino Company Rock Oil (ranked eighteenth).
27 Tsedendamba Batbayar, Mongolia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s : New Identity and New Challenges , Regional Security Issues and Mongolia, Vol. 17 (Ulaanbaatar: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 229.
28 “Mongolia May Pull Troops from Iraq as Early as September” (Mongolia Web News: August 18, 2008),
http://www. mongolia-web.com/content/view/1954/2/
