拉鐵摩爾1933年向美國駐華使館軍事代表處提出有關蒙古的報告

Dr. Alicia J. Campi│廖淑馨　譯
本文是依據本人與巴桑太太（Mrs. R. Baasan）剛完成合寫的《中俄對廿世紀美蒙政治關係影響》一書的摘錄本所撰。本書將於今秋以英、蒙兩種文字出版。我們的研究顯示，美國人和蒙古人在上世紀接觸頻繁。當然，在那段時間最重要的一個人就是，美國蒙古學學者拉鐵摩爾（Owen Lattimore，以下簡稱拉氏）。但直到現在，我們才開始了解拉氏對於蒙古所持的寬宏觀點，以及他對美國政府對蒙政策的影響。本文所分析新近發現的拉氏於1933年3月29日向美國駐華使館武官W.S. Drysdale中校所提的報告1，就是一個例子。

拉氏於1900年出生於華府，但一年後隨家人赴抵上海，他曾被送到歐洲求學數年，Ⅰ次大戰期間回到中國，任職英國的進出口公司Arnhold and Company七年。他也曾在北京及天津時報擔任過一年的記者。在Arnhold and Company工作時，他學會了讀寫流利的中文。因為他的公司在呼和浩特有一家羊毛倉庫，他在1925年到過內蒙古的這個城市，在那兒他見到了駱駝商隊，而引發他到蒙古旅行的想法。他和太太Eleanor在北京相遇，而在他們從突厥斯坦到印度的漫長蜜月旅行途中，他們見到蒙古部落，並見證中國占領內蒙古。拉氏於1928-29年進入哈佛大學研究所以及在中國的哈佛－燕京研究院就讀，而且之後的幾年在滿洲、北京及內蒙等地旅遊及從事研究工作。在中國北方的這些年，拉氏遇見了他那個時期的偉大旅行家及冒險家，包括Frans August Larson, Roy Chapman Andrews，以及許多的中國領袖，如蔣介石。

他同時和美國駐北京使館建立了良好關係，且成為使館武官辦公室的線民。從武官Drysdale於1933年3月29日送到華府之有關蒙古的詳細報告全部由拉氏執筆，就知道拉氏的觀點受重視的程度。拉氏在報告中，分外蒙古和內蒙古兩個部分分析。外蒙長久以來對於蒙古「不屬於」中國的強烈聲明，他表示同情。他了解，蒙古人想要建立一個自治的政府，卻促使中國加快在1919年將之占領。它「……如此殘忍地對待蒙古人，現在最不可能發生的事就是，介乎外蒙及中國之間的任何自發性的聯盟。」2不過，他了解國際對蒙古地位及「國家實況」的承認是有障礙，因為美國及西方國家在承認蘇聯上的猶豫以及「討厭」。

在兇殘的恩琴公爵（Baron Ungern-Sernburg）於1921年將中國人趕走後，拉氏寫道「布爾雪維克的涉入就如同解放，蘇聯無須征服外蒙；它只要將一個已隨興而為的民族組織起來就可以了。」3他說，對蒙古人而言，1924年活佛逝世後依據蘇聯路線重組國家，不是俄式的征服，反而是真正的親蘇，建立起親蘇的政黨，儘管俄國人涉入到蒙古的政治重整，但蒙古人仍然掌握住他們自己的政府。

但在他的報告中，拉氏認為在蒙古仍有一股很強烈的反對革命政府的力量。他詳述有幾千名蒙古人在最後的一年冒著被槍殺的危險而逃越邊境。其他較年輕的蒙古人基於民族主義而以蘇聯為榜樣，「一種粗糙民主的特徵，」以及「舊秩序階級的殞落，到民族危機的升高，以及在現世權力新情勢的自我調適。」4這些蒙古人被「進步及現代化」和「打擊宗教信仰及喇嘛政治地位」是不能分開的說法所說服。

武官Drysdale肯定拉氏的觀點，確定1933年睿智的觀察家們已證實俄國並未以武力控制蒙古。蒙古沒有俄軍駐防，在蒙古的俄國官員都是教練而非指揮官，俄國的文官及技術人員很少，但廣受歡迎。

換言之，外蒙政府可能受到俄國的影響及鼓舞，但稱之為假俄國政府則是不公平的。它是基於蒙古人當中的重要少數者的翻版俄國想法……事實似乎是，外蒙政府的力量既非俄國恐怖主義，亦非任何特別的惡魔俄國誤導一個半野蠻民族的陰謀。而是較年輕且較活躍的蒙古人所主導，他們發現除了俄國之外，找不到援手及同情，而且除了俄國之外，沒有現代化的榜樣可學。」5

這份報告的第二部分是關於內蒙古，拉氏認為，中國想維持將該地區分成幾個省份以控制，而仍由王公掌政。他注意到已成功地趕走中國的殖民，並且預言蒙古王公不會離開中國，除非中國採取「輕率辦法」加強控制，或者他們深深受到與滿洲國聯盟以確保真正自治的誘惑。6

對拉氏而言，內蒙是「在外蒙已被破壞的所有東西的堡壘－（原文）舊傳統、王公權力、宗教的神聖性。」7 

當然，這在2008年特別諷刺，現在內蒙古已非常漢化，蒙古文化及傳統正努力保存，而在獨立的蒙古，蒙古民族主義及文化是充滿活力。不過，當中國人強迫保守的內蒙古人走到「最後的絕境」時，拉氏在1930年代已見到蒙古領土的逐漸中國殖民化。王公不再有任何多餘土地可商磋讓出：「蒙古人必須抵抗或放棄過去的生活方式，而和中國人一樣地生活，最後就消失在中國人當中。」8

拉氏提到蒙古青年黨（Young Mongol Party）在內蒙古的崛起並很快地具有影響力。該黨的目標是，拯救蒙古人作為一個民族，或至少在中國境內接受教育及現代化的同時，它是一個領土、語言及種族不同的團體。為了生存而做出必要的澈底改變，他們……必須反對貴族統治，反中國以及反宗教－至少希望將喇嘛的特權撤除。因為不可能終止中國的殖民，也不可能和它妥協，在走向自治的運動中，這些年輕的蒙古人就在和外蒙古聯盟或者爭取滿洲國
及日本支持的想法中拿不定主意。9

拉氏相信，滿洲最後一個皇帝建立的滿洲國對於蒙古王公是一個號召力，因為在勢均力敵的競爭者當中選出一個領袖，在內部是有許多的競爭。他的結論是，儘管內、外蒙古有許多的差異，團結所有部落的衝力是迫切的，外蒙古有最好的權力來領導任何團結的進程。雖然，拉氏在報告中沒有呼籲美國承認蒙古或承認獨立蒙古的事實，但他的觀點卻是十足地同情這樣的一個政策：蒙古人當中最重要的分歧就在於內、外蒙古－一方面是年輕人、現代化者、相信「進步」及「文明」者，另方面是君主主義者、王公、寺院、保守者以及不相信改變及新方法者。除了政治及宗教之外，所有的蒙古人都有一種強烈的兄弟情感。種族及語言對他們來說幾乎是不可侵犯的。在所有不同的支持下，一種強烈的情感就是，所有的蒙古人應該團結統一。他們爭吵的只是達成團結統一的方法而已。外蒙古擁有蒙古種族的故土以及蒙古的驕傲，在團結統一的訴求上，超過內蒙古。10

Drysdale在拉氏1933年的報告中附上其自己衷懇的背書。他說拉氏「對蒙古人的了解最具權威，」11並說明對於蒙古事務的適當知識，與正確了解日本人支持的滿洲國運動造成北亞、中亞可能的改變，是無法分開的。Drysdale建議其在北京的軍事代表處採取一個驚人的行動，它與美國官方當時對中國及蒙古的政策是不一致的。他個人及官方承認蒙古獨立如同一個自治國，既不受蘇聯控制，亦不受中國控制，因此他命令：在「軍事代表處」文摘中提到目前的蒙古並非一個自治國的字眼應該刪去。文摘目前過份強調蘇聯控制該國政治及軍事活動的程度。蘇聯如果需要支援的話，無疑的會期待獲得蒙古在反日及反中國方面的軍事支持，但是決定權在於蒙古政府。重點是，蒙古雖可以自己做決定，但在目前的情況下，無疑的其決定會對蘇聯有利，而在未來的十年，相同的官員所做的決定則可能會對日本有利。12

結論
拉氏在1934年為美國使館從事田野工作及做線民報告時，他成為約翰霍布金斯大學（John
Hopkins Univ.）出版的Pacific Affairs的主編。此項工作迫使他在1930年代中葉返回美國，成為約翰霍布金斯大學的教授以及Walter Hines Page國際關係學院的主任。他停止向美國駐華使館提報告。但在那個時候他已經是教育家、記者及政府官員公認最重要的美國蒙古學學者。

書評‧拉鐵摩爾1933年向美國駐華使館軍事代表處提出有關蒙古的報告(（前篇譯文）

1　W.S. Drysdale, Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry, Military Attache, “China (Political), Subject: Mongolia,” No. 8546, 2657-I-
319 (Peking: March 29, 1933, received in War Department April 25, 1933), Department of State declassified microfiche, No.
3030, Reel 12.
2　Ibid., 1.
3　Ibid., 1-2.
4　Ibid.
5　Ibid., 2.
6　Ibid., 1.
7　Ibid., 3.
8　Ibid.,
9　Ibid.,
10　Ibid.,
11　Ibid., 4.
12　Ibid.

OWEN LATTIMORE’S 1933 REPORT ON MONGOLIA FOR THE MILITARY ATTACHE’S OFFICE IN THE U.S. PEKING LEGATION

Dr. Alicia J. Campi│President the Mongolia Society Burke, Virginia USA

This paper is based on an excerpt from a just completed book that Mrs. R. Baasan and I have written
on The Impact of China and Russia on U.S.-Mongolian Political Relations in the 20th Century. The book will be published in English and Mongolian languages this fall. Our research revealed that there were many contacts between Americans and Mongols during the last century. Certainly, one very important individual during that period was the famous American Mongolist, Owen Lattimore. Yet, only now are we beginning to understand the breadth of Lattimore’s views about Mongolia and his effect on U.S. Government policymaking towards Mongolia. As an example, this paper analyses a newly discovered March 29, 1933 report written by Lattimore in Peking for Lieutenant-Colonel W.S. Drysdale, U.S. Military Attache in the U.S.Legation (or Embassy). 1

Owen Lattimore was born in Washington, D.C. in 1900, but was taken by his family to Shanghai a year later. He was sent to Europe for schooling for several years before and during World War I and returned to China to work seven years for Arnhold and Company, a British import-export trading firm He also spent a year as a reporter for the Peking and Tientsin Times. While with Arnhold and Company, Lattimore learned to read and write fluent Chinese. Because his company had a wool warehouse in Hohehot [Huhhot], he visited this Inner Mongolian city in 1925, where he saw camel caravans which inspired him to travel to Mongolian destinations. He met his wife Eleanor in Peking and on their long honeymoon throughTurkestan to India they met Mongol tribes and witnessed the Chinese occupation of Mongol lands in Inner Mongolia. Lattimore attended Harvard Graduate School and the Harvard-Yenching Institute in China from 1928-1929 and spent the next few years traveling and doing research in Manchuria, Peking, and Inner Mongolia. During these years in north China, Lattimore met many of the great travelers and adventurers of his time, including Frans August Larson and Roy Chapman Andrews, as well as many Chinese leaders such as Chiang Kai-shek.
He also established a strong bond with the U.S. Legation in Peking and became an informant for the
Legation’s Military Attache Office. Just how highly his opinions were valued by American officials is seen by the fact that Military Attaché Drysdale’s comprehensive report on Mongolia, sent to Washington on March 29, 1933, was written entirely by Owen Lattimore. In the report Lattimore divided his analysis into two sections, Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia. Concerning Outer Mongolia, he exhibited sympathy for its strong historical claim that the Mongols did not “belong” to China. He understood that the attempt of the Mongols to establish an Autonomous Government prompted the Chinese occupation of 1919 which “…
treated the Mongols with such brutality that any voluntary union between Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Republic is now most unlikely.”2 Yet, he understood that there was a barrier to international recognition of Mongolia’s status and “the actual state of affairs,” because of American and other western nations’ reluctance and “distaste” to recognize Soviet Russia.
Lattimore wrote that after the Chinese were driven out in 1921 by the “sadistic” Baron Ungern-
Sternberg, “The Bolshevik intervention came as a deliverance. Soviet Russia did not need to conquer Outer Mongolia; it had only to organize a people who were already well disposed in its favor.”3 He concluded that to the Mongols the re-organization of the country along Soviet lines after the death of the Living Buddha in 1924 was not a type of Russian conquest, but that rather a genuine pro-Russian, pro-Soviet party had been built up and, despite Russians being involved in political reorganization, Mongols still controlled their government.
However, in this report Lattimore asserted that there still was a large element in Mongolia bitterly
opposed to the Revolutionary Government. He recounted that several thousand Mongols within the last year had fled across the border despite the risk of being shot. Other younger Mongols modeled themselves on the Soviets out of nationalism, “a tincture of crude democracy,” and “the rank failure of the old order to rise to the national emergency and to adapt itself to the new conditions of power in the modern world.”4 Such Mongols were convinced that progress and modernization were inseparable from attacking established religion and the political positions of lama leaders in the great monasteries.
Military Attaché Drysdale himself corroborated Lattimore’s views by affirming that in 1933 competent observers had testified that Russia did not control Mongolia by force. There were no Russian troops in the country, and the Russian officers were instructors, not commanders. Russian civilian officials and technical workers were few and popular.
In other words, the government of Outer Mongolia may be under the influence and inspiration of Russia but it cannot fairly be called a disguised Russian government. It is based on the genuine conversion to Russian ideas of an important minority among the Mongols….The truth appears to be that the strength of the Outer Mongolian government is founded neither on Russian terrorism nor on any special diabolical Russian ingenuity in misleading a semi-barbaric people. The younger and more energetic men among the Mongols themselves are in control, and they have found no help or sympathy except in Russia and no model for modernization except the Russian.5
In the second section of this report which dealt with Inner Mongolia, Lattimore acknowledged
that China recently had been attempting to shore up its control of the region by breaking it into several provinces, although it was still administered by its own princes. Noting that the Mongols had successfully staved off Chinese colonization, he predicted that the Inner Mongolian princes would not try to break away from China unless the Chinese took “rash efforts” to increase their control or they were strongly tempted by offers of an alliance with Manchukuo guaranteeing genuine autonomy.6
To Lattimore Inner Mongolia was “the stronghold of all that has been destroyed in Outer Mongolia,—[sic] the old tradition, the power of the princes, the sanctity of religion.”7 Of course, this is particularly ironic in 2008, now that Inner Mongolia has experienced so much Sinification that Mongolian culture and traditions are struggling to survive, while in independent Mongolia, Mongolian nationalism and culture are vibrant and strong. But Lattimore in the 1930s already saw increasing Chinese colonization of the Mongol territories as forcing the conservative Inner Mongols into “a desperate last stand.” There was no more spare land to be negotiated away by the princes: “The Mongols must either resist or resign themselves to abandoning the old Mongol way of life, turn to living like the Chinese, and eventually be lost among the Chinese.”8
Lattimore reported the rise of a Young Mongol Party in Inner Mongolia that was rapidly growing in
influence. The goal of the party was to save the Mongols as a nation or at least as a territorial, linguistic,
and racially separate group within China, while still accepting education and modernization. In order to make the drastic changes necessary for survival, they were …of necessity, anti-aristocratic, anti-Chinese and anti-religious—at least to the extent of wishing to dislodge the lamas from their positions of privilege. Because it has proved impossible either to halt Chinese colonization
or compromise with it, the Young Mongols waver between ideas of union with Outer Mongolia and ideas of treating with Manchoukuo [Manchukuo] and Japan for support in a movement toward autonomy.9
Lattimore believed that the establishment of Manchukuo under the last Manchu emperor could be a rallying point for the Mongol princes, because there was so much intra-rivalry to choose a ruler from
contenders nearly equal in status and lineage. His conclusion was that, despite all differences between
Inner and Outer Mongolians, the impetus for unification of the tribes was compelling and that Outer
Mongolia had the best claim to take the lead in any unification process. Thus, although Lattimore did not call in his report for the United States either to recognize Mongolia or to acknowledge the reality of an independent Mongolia, his views were most definitely sympathetic to such a policy:
The most real cleavage among the Mongols themselves is between Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia,— between the young men, the modernizers, the believers in “progress” and “Civilization”, on the one side, and the monarchists, the princes, the church, the conservatives, those who distrust change and new ways, on the other. Politics and religion apart, there is among all Mongols a feeling of blood-brotherhood that is very strong.
Race and language are almost sacred to them. Under all differences of allegiance there is a powerful feeling that all Mongolia ought to be united. It is only over the method of achieving unity that they quarrel. In this appeal for unity Outer Mongolia, with its tradition of being the ancient home of the Mongol race and Mongol glory, dominates Inner Mongolia.10
Colonel Drysdale appended his own comments to the 1933 Lattimore report to heartily endorse
Lattimore’s thinking. He called Lattimore “a foremost authority on the Mongols”11 and explained that a reasonable knowledge of Mongolian affairs was indispensable to properly understanding the changes likely to take place in North-Central Asia as a result of the Japanese-backed Manchukuo movement.
Moreover, Drysdale recommended for his Military Attache Office in Peking a startling course of action at odds with official U.S. policy towards China and Mongolia at that time. He personally and officially recognized the independence of Mongolia as an autonomous state not under the control of the USSR or China, and so ordered that:
Any material now in the [Military Attache Office] digest that indicates that Mongolia as at present formed is not an autonomous state should be removed. The digest at present over emphasizes the degree of control exercised by the U.S.S.R. over both the political and military activities of the state. The U.S.S.R. no doubt would expect and get military support from Mongolia either against Japan or China should the occasion require such support, but the decision would be made by the Mongolian government. The point is that the Mongolian government would be able to make its own decision, a decision which under the present conditions would no doubt be favorable to Russia. Within the next ten years the decision made by the same officials might be favorable to Japan. 12

Conclusion
While doing fieldwork and reporting as an informant for the American Legation in 1934, Lattimore
became Editor of Pacific Affairs, a journal published by the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. This new job compelled him to return to the U.S. in the middle 1930s to become a Johns Hopkins professor and then Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations. His reporting for the American Legation in Peking thus came to an end. However, by then he already was recognized by educators, journalists and government officials as the foremost American scholar on Mongolia.